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Introduction
Technological change has continually shaped the labor 
market for centuries and the past few decades have been no 
exception. Labor economists have shown that during this 
period, increases in computing power allowed for the auto-
mation of conceptually simple and repetitive “routine 
tasks” (Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2003). As technology 
has dramatically affected employment, we might expect it 
to also have an important effect on labor market institu-
tions, notably trade unions. Many routine task jobs, such as 
assembly line work, were in heavily unionized plants. With 
technological change, however, industrial employment 
declined. Factories had fewer workers and workers moved 
into service sector occupations, which did not have histo-
ries of unionization (Hirsch, 2008). Furthermore, the skill 
composition of the workforce became more polarized, with 
increased demand for high-skill workers, but also for low-
skill workers (Goos, Manning and Salomons, 2014).
There is some recent evidence that technological change 
has been in part responsible for the decline in union density, 
both in the USA and across the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Dinlersoz and 
Greenwood, 2016; Meyer, forthcoming). But there has also 
been divergence in several countries between the percentage 
of workers who are union members, which has declined 
almost everywhere, and the percentage of workers who are 
covered by collective agreements (Figure 1). One important 
reason for this is that in several European countries, such as 
France, Spain, and Italy, the government typically extends 
collective agreements to firms that do not sign them, regard-
less of union membership rates (Blainpain, 2005). And col-
lective agreement coverage is very important; as we can see 
in Figure 2, there is a negative cross-country correlation 
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between collective agreement coverage and inequality. In the 
Scandinavian countries, collective agreements are in large 
part responsible for setting high minimum wages (Meyer, 
2016). Despite this, most cross-national studies of union 
strength analyze union density rather than collective bargain-
ing coverage.
In this paper, we address whether technological change 
also affects collective agreement coverage. First, we analyze 
collective bargaining coverage for a sample of 21 OECD 
countries from 1970 to 2010. We find that the effect of tech-
nological change is conditional on whether the government 
extends collective agreements to firms that do not sign them. 
Where there are minimal or no provisions to extend collec-
tive agreements, such as in the USA, the United Kingdom, 
and the Scandinavian countries, technological change is 
associated with a decline in collective bargaining coverage. 
Where collective agreements are commonly extended, as in 
France and Spain, there is little relationship between techno-
logical change and collective bargaining coverage.
Based on this finding, we further probe the relationship 
between technological change and collective agreement 
coverage in contexts where the government has minimal 
involvement in collective agreement application. We 
develop an argument for how technological change would 
Figure 1. Bargaining coverage and union density over time.
AUL: Australia; AUS: Austria; BEL: Belgium; CAN: Canada; DEN: Denmark; FIN: Finland; FRA: France; FRG: Germany; GRE: Greece; IRE: Ireland; 
ITA: Italy; JPN: Japan; NET: Netherlands; NOR: Norway; NZL: New Zealand; POR: Portugal; SPA: Spain; SWE: Sweden; SWZ: Switzerland; UKM: 
United Kingdom; USA: United States of America.
Source: Visser (2014).
Figure 2. Bargaining coverage and income inequality.
Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and Visser (2014).
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cause the decline of collective agreement coverage in such 
an environment by increasing labor market polarization. In 
previous generations, industrial production required large 
amounts of semiskilled workers performing routine tasks. 
Technological change has eliminated many of these jobs, 
resulting in increased demand for both high- and low-skill 
workers. Therefore, at least in part, the effect of technologi-
cal change on collective agreement coverage should be due 
to the between-skill group polarization that it creates.
We test this argument on a sample of linked employer-
employee firm and industry-level data from Germany from 
1993 to 2007. While there are legal provisions to extend 
collective agreements in Germany, the legal hurdles to trig-
gering them are high and they are much less commonly 
used than in other continental countries. We develop a 
measure of the heterogeneity of workers’ skill profiles 
based on education levels. We include both this and a meas-
ure of routine task employment and find evidence for the 
skill heterogeneity effect in both the firm- and industry-
level analyses. When skill heterogeneity is high, firms are 
less likely to participate in collective agreements and indus-
try-level rates of participation are lower. This corroborates 
the mechanism underlying our theory—that the effect of 
technological change on collective agreement coverage 
occurs (at least in part) through its polarizing effect.
Collective agreement coverage: Cross-
national analysis
The standard argument for how technological change 
causes trade union decline is that the most heavily union-
ized workers worked in manufacturing and industry and 
that these occupations were most susceptible to labor-
saving technologies (Hirsch, 2008). The effect came 
largely through attrition; unionized jobs in industry were 
lost and replaced by nonunionized jobs in service sectors. 
In this section, we examine whether this relationship 
holds for collective bargaining coverage in a cross-
national sample.
In addition to examining different outcome variables, pre-
vious work on technological change and union decline has 
not accounted for how institutions might mediate this rela-
tionship. Governments play an important role in the scope of 
collective bargaining coverage across much of Europe. In 
France and Spain, the government typically declares collec-
tive agreements to be universally binding within a sector, 
even if a relatively low percentage of workers work in firms 
that sign these. In these countries, collective bargaining cov-
erage has remained high even though union density is often 
very low. In English-speaking countries, where extension 
procedures are almost nonexistent, rates of collective agree-
ment coverage track union density much more closely.
For these reasons, we expect the relationship between 
technological change and collective agreement coverage to 
be conditional on the degree to which governments extend 
collective agreements. Specifically, we expect technological 
change to be associated with lower collective bargaining 
coverage only when the government does not extend collec-
tive agreements.
To test this, we examine a dataset of 21 OECD countries 
from 1970 to 2010. Data on collective bargaining coverage, 
the percentage of the workforce covered by a collective 
agreement, come from Visser (2015).1 To capture techno-
logical change, we generate a measure of routine task 
employment (RTE) using data on occupational distribu-
tions from European Union Labor Force Surveys for the 
period 1992–2010 and from the International Labor 
Organization pre-1992.2 We generate our measure of RTE 
by computing the percentage of employment for each occu-
pation within each country year, multiply each of these by 
the respective measures of occupational routine task inten-
sity (we obtain the occupation-specific indicator for rou-
tine-task intensity from Goos et al., 2014), and then sum 
these scores within country-year. Our measure indicates the 
degree of employment in routine task occupations in each 
country-year. If technological change is associated with 
declining collective bargaining coverage, we would expect 
a positive coefficient on RTE; that is, bargaining coverage 
is higher when RTE is higher.
Our measure of extension procedures EXT comes from 
Visser (2014) and consists of four categories indicating 
increasing presence of extension. We expect a positive rela-
tionship between EXT and bargaining coverage. We also 
expect it to mediate the relationship between RTE and cov-
erage. When EXT is high, we would expect the effect of 
RTE on coverage to be lower than when EXT is low. 
Because of this, we expect a negative coefficient on the 
interaction RTE × EXT.
We analyze our data using a Generalized Error Correction 
Model because panel unit root tests demonstrate nonsta-
tionarity in our dependent variable, and cointegration tests 
demonstrate cointegration between RTE and bargaining 
coverage (DeBoef and Keele, 2008).
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where ΔYt represents current changes in bargaining cover-
age (the first-differenced dependent variable addresses 
nonstationarity). Here ΔXt and Xt−1 and ΔZt and Zt−1, respec-
tively, are vectors of the current changes and lagged levels 
of our two main independent variables and Yt−1 is a vector 
of the lagged level of the dependent variable L.Coverage. 
The variables τ1 and β0 through β3 are their respective coef-
ficients. In parentheses are all possible interaction terms 
between the current changes and lagged levels of our two 
main independent variables with β4 through β7 serving as 
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their coefficients (Warner, 2016). Current changes and 
lagged levels of our control variables are represented by 
ΔWk,t and Wk,t−1 with their coefficients in βk. Finally, λi rep-
resents country dummies (included in the fixed effects 
models), γt represents year dummies, α0 is the constant, and 
ε is the error term. We standardize the coefficients so that 
they can be interpreted as the change in bargaining cover-
age percentage associated with a 1 SD increase in the 
respective coefficient.
We first run the models without the country fixed effects 
and without controls to assess potential overspecification 
issues or problems arising from restricted variance within 
countries (Models 1 and 2). Then we successively intro-
duce the covariates (Models 3 and 4) and the country fixed 
effects (Models 5 and 6). Models 1, 3, and 5 of Table 1 
regress bargaining coverage on differences and levels of 
RTE and EXT in random effects models without and with 
controls and fixed effects models with controls. Models 2, 
4, and 6 present the same models but add the interaction 
terms between RTE and EXT. The results indicate that there 
is no strong main effect of RTE on coverage. A 1 SD 
increase in EXT, however, is associated with approximately 
six percentage points higher bargaining coverage, consist-
ent with our expectation.3
Looking at the interaction terms, we find some confirma-
tion for our expectations. A short-term increase in RTE has 
a weaker association with bargaining coverage as EXT 
increases. Figure 3 (based on Model 6) displays the moder-
ated marginal effect for three levels of EXT (the mean and 1 
SD below and above the mean). As we would have expected, 
when extension provisions are low, higher RTE is strongly 
positively associated with bargaining coverage. Notice also 
that when we include the interaction between RTE and EXT, 
the coefficient on short-run EXT becomes insignificant, fur-
ther demonstrating the importance of accounting for the 
conditional relationship between them, as a short-run change 
in EXT is not associated with a change in coverage when 
RTE is at the mean (the 0 of the standardized variable).
While these models lend some credence to our theoreti-
cal considerations, cautious interpretation is advised. Most 
Table 1. Regressions of bargaining coverage on technological change and extension procedures (error correction models).
(1)
Random effects
(2)
Random effects
(3)
Random effects
(4)
Random effects
(5)
Fixed
effects
(6)
Fixed
effects
L.Coverage –0.009 0.001 –0.029+ –0.024 –0.179*** –0.169***
(0.012) (0.006) (0.017) (0.016) (0.032) (0.033)
D.RTE 0.495 0.192 0.122 –0.357 0.140 –0.167
(0.393) (0.391) (0.509) (0.522) (0.502) (0.515)
L.RTE 0.305 0.248 0.219 0.324 0.361 0.472
(0.242) (0.189) (0.253) (0.266) (0.433) (0.417)
D.EXT 6.037** 1.038 6.230** 0.849 5.530* 1.017
(2.002) (0.703) (1.933) (1.133) (2.037) (1.468)
L.EXT 0.326 0.205 0.552* 0.490+ 1.424 1.425
(0.260) (0.213) (0.278) (0.275) (0.897) (0.842)
D.RTE*D.EXT –12.908*** –13.842*** –12.029***
 (0.506) (1.093) (1.817)
D.RTE*L.EXT 0.410 –0.000 –0.229
 (0.262) (0.299) (0.317)
L.RTE*D.EXT 2.512* 2.593* 2.207+
 (0.992) (1.146) (1.254)
L.RTE*L.EXT 0.254 0.230+ 0.187
 (0.206) (0.124) (0.216)
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.376 –0.099 0.836 0.667 6.522+ 6.510+
(0.845) (0.605) (1.171) (1.129) (3.482) (3.259)
Observations 607 607 607 607 607 607
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 21 21
Standardized coefficients, with country clustered SEs in parentheses. Controls include log gross domestic product, percentage of industrial 
employment, unemployment, cabinet composition, federalism, trade openness, capital account openness, female employment, union density 
(all from Brady, Huber and Stephens, 2014), works council rights, union organizational and strike rights, collective agreements extension 
procedures (from Visser, 2015), and “offshorability” (based on Goos, Manning and Salomons, 2014), migration Lee (2005), UN (1977,  
1985).
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, +p < 0.1.
Note: L.XXX refers to one-year lagged levels of a variable while D.XXX refers to first differences.
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importantly, changes in EXT are very rare and thus the 
major interaction effect between the first differences of 
RTE and EXT relies on relatively few observations. This 
might also explain the large coefficient (e.g., an increase of 
approximately 13 percentage points in bargaining coverage 
being associated with a 1 SD increase in RTE in a low EXT 
context).4 This issue is exacerbated in the fixed effects 
models that rely only on within-country variation. 
Nevertheless, the coefficient on the short-run interaction 
term is of consistent size across the specifications, which 
increases our confidence in the robustness of the result.
Labor market polarization and 
collective agreements
While we have provided evidence that the relationship 
between technological change and collective agreement 
coverage is conditional on extension procedures, many 
countries either do not have or make minimal use of these 
procedures. Therefore, it is worthwhile to develop further 
theory about how technological change should affect col-
lective agreement coverage in an environment without 
extension.
We build off a limited, but inciteful literature. Acemoglu 
et al. (2001) developed a model in which technological 
change causes union decline by shifting the demand for 
labor in favor of skilled over unskilled workers. This work 
builds on the concept of skill-biased technological change—
that there has been a linearly increasing relationship 
between skill levels and demand for those skills (Goldin 
and Katz, 2008). Because unions compress wages between 
these groups, skilled workers defect from unions.
Dinlersoz and Greenwood (2016)5 argue that skilled 
workers are more heterogeneous than unskilled workers 
and will be less likely to form unions due to their interest 
heterogeneity. They find an association between skill-
biased technological change and union density decline in 
the USA. While remaining relatively agnostic about the 
mechanisms, Meyer (forthcoming) finds a similar relation-
ship between technological change and union density 
decline for a sample of OECD countries.
But while these previous explanations develop their 
arguments based on skill heterogeneity, the mechanisms 
that they posit are somewhat different from those suggested 
by recent work on technological change and employment. 
In contrast to the skill-biased technological change hypoth-
esis, this recent work has shown that technological change 
has a polarizing effect on employment, increasing employ-
ment at the high and low ends of the wage spectrum while 
decreasing that in the middle (Autor and Dorn, 2013; Goos 
et al., 2014).
In line with this new understanding of labor market 
change, we argue that technological change-induced labor 
market polarization creates a new economic cleavage 
between high- and low-skill workers over support for unions 
that impacts both trade union density and the coverage of 
collective agreements. Our theory follows recent work in 
political science on institutional development, which has 
shown that greater between-group heterogeneity decreases 
the probability of developing encompassing institutions 
(Ahlquist, 2010; Lupu and Pontusson, 2011). The polariza-
tion of employment into high- and low-wage occupations 
and “hollowing out” of the middle part of the wage distri-
bution may affect both individual preferences for unioniza-
tion and the distribution of preferences for unionization 
across the skill spectrum. High- and low-skill groups should 
have different preferences for unions, which equalize 
wages both across and within skill groups, and between 
firms in multi-firm agreements (Freeman and Medoff, 
1984). New technology increases the demand for both pro-
grammers and engineers, who create and maintain new 
technology, as well as for personnel and business managers 
to manage what are often more complicated production net-
works. This gives these workers a great deal of individual 
wage bargaining power and less desire to be represented by 
unions.
As the distance between skill groups in their ability to 
make wage demands increases, these different groups 
should be less likely to agree on whether they should be 
covered by collective agreements, which redistribute 
between groups by aiming for parity in wage increases. 
Low-skill workers want wage redistribution, but high-skill 
workers do not and have high individual bargaining power 
in a nonunionized workplace. Furthermore, as demand for 
high-skill workers increases due to their importance for 
developing and operating new technology, their wages 
increase and the wage gap between high-skill and low-skill 
workers increases. If redistribution raises the median wage 
toward the mean, the amount that is redistributed from 
them to low-skill workers increases with the wage gap. 
Figure 3. Marginal effect of RTE (short-run) on bargaining 
coverage by levels of extension provisions.
Note: Marginal effects calculated from Model 6 in Table 1 (based on all 
three coefficients that include D.RTE).
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Redistribution has greater “bite” for high-skill workers and 
they should be more averse to a redistributive institution, 
such as unions.
Polarization and collective agreement 
participation: Evidence from Germany
To test this argument, we use two linked employer-
employee data from Germany: the firm-level Linked 
employer-employee data of the Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- 
und Berufsforschung (LIAB) longitudinal model version 2 
and the LIAB Cross-Section Model 2.6 Both of these data-
sets consist of the Institute for Employment Research 
Establishment Panel (Betriebspanel), a yearly survey of 
between 4500 and 16,000 firms with questions on firm 
performance, employment, training, etc., and social secu-
rity records drawn for each of the firm's employees each 
year on June 30, containing information on sex, level of 
school completion, and occupation. Firms are selected in a 
stratified random sample according to industry, federal 
state, and size.7 The Longitudinal Model includes firms in 
most or all years of the Establishment Panel while the 
Cross-Section Model consists of the full yearly sample of 
firms. We aggregate the latter at the industry-level to 
examine whether differences in skill profiles between 
firms are also associated with lower participation in collec-
tive agreements.
In Germany, firms make the decision to participate in col-
lective agreements primarily by being members of an 
employers' association, which concludes an industry-wide 
agreement with a major union, typically at federal state level 
(Silvia and Schroeder, 2007).8 Collective agreement exten-
sion exists in Germany, but it has a high threshold for enact-
ment: 50% of firms within a sector nationwide must 
participate in the collective agreement and the must petition 
the federal government to extend it to noncovered firms. 
Although the employer makes the decision to participate in a 
collective agreement, this will be, in part, a function of 
employer and worker preferences and power resources, as 
developed in our theory. While the German case is not gen-
eralizable to countries where collective agreement extension 
is common, it is somewhat analogous to the USA, UK, and 
Canada, which have, but do not always require, workplace 
union recognition votes.9 As we see in Figure 3, although the 
percentage of firms covered by collective agreements in 
Germany has been declining, it remains relatively high.
We focus here (see Figure 4) on industry-level agree-
ments, the predominant form of collective agreement. We 
perform two sets of analyses: (a) a firm-level analysis using 
the Longitudinal Model; and (b) an industry-level analysis 
using the (weighted) Cross-Section Model aggregated at 
the industry-level for each year. The dependent variable in 
the firm-level analysis is an indicator of whether the firm 
participates in an industry-level collective agreement. For 
the industry-level analysis, it is the percentage of firms par-
ticipating in an industry-level agreement. We believe that 
the industry-level analysis is important because workers 
may sort into firms based on skill level and recent work has 
shown that German wage inequality is increasingly being 
driven by differences between firms (Card, Heining and 
Kline, 2013).
In addition to our RTE variable, which we generate here 
in the same way as in the cross-national analysis, we gener-
ate two measures of worker polarization. In the firm-level 
data, we generate the SD of worker’s education levels for 
each workplace-year (H.SKILL) from a six-category edu-
cation variable. At the industry-level, we take the SD of 
mean firm-level education profiles (from the same six cat-
egory variable) for all firms in that sector. We hypothesize 
that firms with higher levels of H.SKILL will be more 
likely to withdraw from collective agreements and that 
industries with higher levels of H.SKILL will have a lower 
percentage of firms participating in collective agreements. 
We also generate a variable for the workplace’s mean edu-
cation profile (M.SKILL), which we might think, following 
Thelen (2014), would be associated with a higher probabil-
ity of collective agreement persistence. High-skill work 
forces should be more likely to retain collective agreements 
if they are homogeneous because workers are more diffi-
cult to replace.
For the firm-level analysis, we use a Cox Proportional 
Hazards Model, modeling the number of years until a firm 
withdraws from a collective agreement as a function of our 
covariates, plus industry, federal state (Bundesland), and 
industry × federal state fixed effects.10 Because there are sev-
eral instances in the data where a firm reenters a collective 
agreement after dropping out in some previous year, we set 
the data as single-record data where a firm drops out of the 
dataset after not participating in a collective agreement but 
reenters the next time it participates in a collective agreement. 
The clock restarts when the firm reenters a collective 
Figure 4. German firms collective agreement participation. 
Source: LIAB Cross-Section, Version 2 (weighted data).
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agreement.11 For the industry-level analysis, we use Ordinary 
Least Squares with fixed effects for industry and year.
Table 2, columns 1 and 2, present the firm level results 
without and with controls respectively, whereas columns 3 
and 4 present these for the industry-level data. The regres-
sion coefficients in columns 1 and 2 are hazard ratios and 
give the odds of collective agreement withdrawal with a one-
unit increase of the independent variable. Higher values are 
associated with a higher probability of withdrawal—a hazard 
ratio of 2 would indicate that with a one-unit increase in the 
independent variable, twice as many firms withdraw in a 
given period, whereas a hazard ratio of 0.95 would mean 
95% as many firms withdraw. Coefficients in the industry-
level regressions in columns 3 and 4 are interpretable as the 
percentage increase/decrease in collective agreement partici-
pation with a one-unit increase in the independent variable.
As we can see, higher skill heterogeneity is associated 
with a higher percentage of withdrawal from collective 
agreements both at the firm and industry-level. With an 
increase in one unit of H.SKILL, firms are four percentage 
points more likely to withdraw from a collective agreement 
in a given period in both Models 1 and 2. The opposite is 
true for firms’ mean skill levels; with a one-unit increase in 
M.SKILL, firms are between three and seven percentage 
points less likely to withdraw. While higher levels of RTE 
are associated with lower probability of withdrawal, these 
results are not statistically significant. This suggests that 
the effect is driven by polarization between workers rather 
than occupational change itself.
The results for skill heterogeneity in the industry-level 
data are similar. Here, 1 SD of skill difference between firms 
is associated with seven and six percentage points lower 
participation in collective agreements respectively. We also 
find a relationship with RTE; industries with higher RTE 
also have higher participation in collective agreements. 
Unlike the firm-level regressions, we do not find strong evi-
dence that industries employing higher-skill workers are 
more likely to participate in collective agreements.
Conclusion
We find that the effect of technological change on collec-
tive agreement coverage is conditional on collective agree-
ment extension and that in Germany, where this is minimally 
used, the effect is primarily driven by between-worker and 
between-firm skill heterogeneity. We examine a sample of 
21 OECD countries (1970–2010) and find that where gov-
ernments regularly extend collective agreements, there is 
little effect of technological change on collective agree-
ment coverage. But where this is uncommon, decline of 
RTE is associated with reduced collective bargaining cov-
erage. To further probe the mechanism underlying the latter 
result, we develop theory about how technological change 
increases polarization between skill groups in union prefer-
ences and test this in firm- and industry-level data from 
Germany. We find that skill heterogeneity is associated 
with lower participation in collective agreements at both 
the firm- and industry-level.
Our results underscore the importance of institutional 
factors for union strength. Although this general point is 
hardly original, recent work on how technological change 
impacts unions has not accounted for the potentially condi-
tional relationship between technological change and insti-
tutions. Our results suggest that even if technological 
change further threatens, politicians can reduce this effect 
on union outcomes by creating legal conditions more 
favorable for collective agreement coverage.
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Notes
 1. Bargaining coverage data for several countries is spotty. We 
use linear interpolation to fill these holes, although we do not 
interpolate before the first year or after the last year of data.
 2. We do not include employment in agriculture or in the armed 
forces.
 3. We do not further interpret the lagged coefficients, but to 
arrive at the long-run multiplier, the displayed first differ-
enced and lagged coefficient would have to be added and 
divided by 1 minus the lagged dependent variable (DeBoef 
and Keele, 2008).
 4. The same applies to the interaction effect between lagged 
RTE and the first differenced EXT, which is not our central 
focus here.
 5. Wallerstein (1990) develops a similar model showing how 
complementarity between different skill groups enables cen-
tralized wage bargaining.
 6. Data access was provided via on-site use at the Research Data 
Centre (Forschungsdatenzentrum) of the German Federal 
Employment Agency (Bundesministerium für Arbeit) at 
the Institute for Employment Research in both Ann Arbor, 
Michigan, USA and Berlin, Germany.
 7. It is compulsory for employers to report the individual data, 
allowing creation of full firm-year profiles of each firm's 
workforce characteristics.
 8. German establishments have historically signed only one 
collective agreement, which covers all of their workers. 
However, this has begun to change, following a 2010 
Supreme Court ruling, which held that establishments 
could be covered by multiple agreements. The current 
grand coalition government has considered a law that 
would mandate no more than one collective agreement per 
workplace (that of the largest union), in part in response to 
persistent strikes by minority railway and pilot unions in 
2015.
 9. Unlike Germany, each of these countries has a formal ballot-
ing procedure through which workers in individual workplaces 
decide whether to be represented by a union. These votes are 
not necessary in Canada or the USA, however, if the employer 
voluntarily agrees to recognize a union through a “card check” 
procedure, under which a substantial percentage of workers 
(30–50% in Canada; >50% in the USA) vote for union recog-
nition. Union recognition in the UK was historically voluntary 
on the part of employers, as it currently is in Germany, with 
the statutory recognition process having been introduced in the 
1999 Employment Relations Act.
10. Industry × federal state fixed effects are especially impor-
tant because collective agreements are typically concluded at 
the federal state level.
11. We perform three additional firm-level analyses in the 
Online Appendix, where we vary the method of accounting 
for multiple collective agreement withdrawals. The results 
are substantively very similar.
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